This was an interesting find for me, theoretically, because it is similar to the idea about the forward/backward nature of autographical living that I've been trying to work out. On first glance, I even imagined that this was precisely what Bakhtin meant. However, as I've now looked more closely at the context, I see that it's only an adjacent concept which may, nonetheless, illuminate the "historical inversion" I had hoped it would be.
Bakhtin's Historical Inversion
When Bakhtin uses the term, he means that the normal vision of history has been reversed. The "normal" expectation is that events which have not yet happened in the present must occur in the future, if they are to occur at all; the past is complete, so all new events must necessarily occur in the future. However, in historical inversion, one sees the future as limited instead of the past. As Bakhtin explains it:
"The essence of this inversion is found in the fact that mythological and artistic thinking locates such categories as purpose, ideal, justice, perfection, the harmonious condition of man and society and the like in the past ... We might say that a thing that could and in fact must only be realized exclusively in the future is here portrayed as something out of the past, a thing that is in no sense part of the past's reality, but a thing that is in its essence a purpose, an obligation," (148).
In this mode of thought, the past is valued at the expense of the future. It's a nostalgic vision of time; it assumes that the past contained something uniquely good in it which has since been lost and can never be found again. Whatever future comes can never achieve the grandeur of the golden age that once was.
This makes it an existentially problematic world-view because it prescribes stagnation, if not decline; it is impossible to progress along any positive axis when the whole of the future is presumed to be less able to welcome success than was a past which never existed. It also presents pragmatic problems because believing that the past contained something ideal which never actually existed makes real positive action impossible, since beginning with unrealistic expectations, whether of what was once possible and therefore ought to be the overall goal for the future, or of predetermined failure or limitations, makes progress unlikely. This world view, then, instead of truly announcing a fact of the world, becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, as those believing in the future's inherent want will create a wanting future.
I don't mean to suggest that this is the only system in which the subscribers act based on false ideals. I don't know that it's even possible to not act in this way. I merely mean to point out what might be the important problems of historical inversion, which Bakhtin names as such but does not explicitly describe.
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Historical inversion and Adventure: creative solutions for authentic living?
How might this conception of historical inversion inform my own conception of autobiography? My interest in the idea is in its its use of the different temporal periods to create the identities of each period; past informs future in historical inversion as it limits its potential, but present also informs past, as it's from present ideals that the supposed past golden era is defined.
In a parallel process, Roquentin creates the idea of adventure. He takes present ideals and creates from them a past which has not really happened. The primary difference in this part of the process, apart from the scale of the expectation (whole cultural eras vs. self-identity in a limited expanse of time) is the scale of the fictional work done. To create adventure out of experience, Roquentin does not have to do much reevaluation. The experience is there, it only requires a different temporal position from which to see the events in order to go from "experience" to "adventure." In contrast, imbuing the past, as an era, with ideals takes a greater effort, which gives the impression of being a greater fallacy. I would go so far as to say Roquentin's adventure creation process is natural, and perhaps necessary, whereas the process of historical inversion, as it is an inversion of the expected temporal vision, is clearly not a necessary or normal process in today's world.
Besides these these implications of the two processes for the past and present, there is, of course, also the question of how they affect the future. We've already seen how historical inversion proves destructive to the future, assuming that it is indeed a false belief and that there is therefor something to be lost by its belief. I think that, again, the difference in effect is a matter of scale. Does the conception of adventure paralyze Roquentin? Is each adventure a small aesthetic hiatus like the final aesthetic solution is in Ruppert's analysis?
The obvious answer is yes. You have to choose, live or tell, because telling (i.e., creating adventure) requires the cessation of life. This, I believe, is for clear temporal reasons. What interests me is whether or not this activity then proves productive for the self since it helps create an identity on which the individual can rely, or if it only offers temporary existential consolation.
Bakhtin says: "If taken outside its relationship to past and future, the present loses its integrity, breaks down into isolated phenomena and objects, making them a mere abstract conglomeration," (146). Adventure-making concretizes past experience so that it can be remembered in the present as a meaningful experience, which allows it to aid in the construction of a self-identity. It therefore performs a necessary function of identity in linking the past to the present. Bakhtin includes "future" in his temporal context, and adventure-making's utility relies on its ending with the present. Instead of aiding identity, projecting adventure into the future actually proves destructive to choice and is potentially the cause of the never-ending present problem with which I've been struggling throughout this thesis process.
When adventure-making uses only events from the past to create an event, that event informs the present conception of self because it gives the individual the ability to point to an experience they've had as a precedent for present/future action. However, if the individual instead attempts to define the adventure as beginning in the past and stretching into the future, they come up with unrealistic expectations for how the future will be, since that imagined future is based off of fictional representations. That kind of future will never arrive since, as we've already seen, reality doesn't unwind like fictional plots do; if it did, there would be no need for any kind of aesthetic solution, since life would already have an imposed order. Waiting for these impossible events to occur as the next "plot points"in life paralyzes the individual, making authentic living impossible.
This demonstrates that adventure-making is a vital part of self-consciousness and identity, but that it must be kept in check; as shown, it is a dangerous tool which allows future action but which can also, if allowed too great a leash, ruin the individual's potential for action. The creative aesthetic solution is really a useful activity, if kept in the past. It becomes problematic when it bleeds over into the future. I had cast myself in the position of "thesis-writer" at the beginning of this project and could not begin my work because of the fictional expectations I had about what the experience ought to be like. I don't know how to defeat this impulse to fictionalize the whole of the self instead of only the past experiences,. The only way I know to circumnavigate the problem is to begin in any way possible, and to eventually try to work back around to the original goal in such a way that it doesn't realize you're coming for it. But is self-deception really the only solution?
KJ Treehouse, McEwan Dining hall, Burke Library, KJ Study Room, Hamilton College, NY - 14 April 2013.
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